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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
SAVING EUROPE ‘UNDER STRICT CONDITIONALITY’: 
A THREAT FOR EU SOCIAL DIMENSION? 
 
This paper looks at the compatibility of EU anti-crisis measures with some key  
elements of the EU legal system. In particular, it focuses on the financial assis-
tance programmes devised to rescue some EU Member States that, due to their 
unsustainably high public debts, came under severe pressure from the financial 
markets. In all these cases, recipient States have been invariably required to adopt 
draconian austerity measures in order to have access to the financial help. This  
paper argues that some of the conditions attached to the assistance packages raise 
doubts as to their compatibility with a number of basic social principles and objec-
tives that represent the foundations of the EU social dimension. This is the case 
with regard to the social objectives enshrined in the Treaties, the allocation of 
competences between the EU and Member States in the social field and, lastly, 
some of the social rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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SAVING EUROPE  
‘UNDER STRICT CONDITIONALITY’: A THREAT 
FOR EU SOCIAL DIMENSION? 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The crisis of sovereign debts in the Euro area is rightly considered as a threat 
not just for the future of the common currency, but also for the whole Europe-
an integration process. The problem is that the anti-crisis strategy adopted by the 
EU and its Member States is equally threatening, albeit for different reasons. EU 
decision-makers are seemingly convinced that the need to find a swift and effi-
cient response to the unprecedented challenges posed by the crisis may justify 
the recourse to measures that are potentially incompatible with fundamental  
aspects of the EU legal framework. This approach, which is fairly common in 
‘emergency times’, raises doubts as to its legitimacy and, far from helping the EU 
out of the crisis, it may end up damaging the prospects of the European integra-
tion process. 
 
This is the case, for instance, with financial assistance measures devised to assist 
EU States that, due to their high public debt, came under severe pressure by  
financial markets. One of the prominent features of these packages is the policy 
conditionality attached to them. In order to receive the financial help, recipient 
States are required to adopt a set of fiscal consolidation measures aimed at halting 
the deterioration in their public finance position. Adjustment programmes invaria-
bly rest upon draconian austerity measures, aiming at the reduction of States’ debt 
primarily through severe cuts to public spending and, in particular, through drastic 
reductions to social expenditure. In this context, restoring financial stability seems 
to be considered as an absolute priority, to be achieved even at the expenses of 
any other competing objective, such as social ones. 
 
This paper aims to assess the compatibility of this approach with a number of 
basic social principles and objectives that represent the foundations of the EU so-
cial dimension. The paper looks, first of all, at the conditionality instruments used 
in the context of the financial assistance packages for EU countries, trying to shed 
some light on the relevant legal framework. Subsequently, it analyses the content 
of conditionality, by taking into account the cases of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
Lastly, it seeks to assess the compatibility of these measures with three elements 
WP-LPF 7/12 • ISSN 2036-1246 6
that, especially after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, can be taken as 
key pillars of the EU social dimension. 
 
 
 
2. CONDITIONALITY IN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGES 
TO ASSIST EU COUNTRIES 
 
Conditionality represents a prominent feature in all the financial assistance pack-
ages and mechanisms that have been put in place to respond to the needs of those 
EU Member States that suffered most from the economic crisis. This was the case 
already with earlier balance-of-payments assistance programmes1 used to rescue 
non-Euro States, such as Hungary, Latvia and Romania, as well as with regard to 
the financial package hastily arranged to save Greece in 2010. Likewise, condition-
ality constitutes a foundational element of all the financial mechanisms that have 
been created after the eruption of the crisis. The European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM),2 created in 2010 and used to provide relief to Portugal and Ire-
land, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF),3 established in 2010 as a tem-
porary mechanism to provide financial help to Euro area Member States, and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM),4 which is set to replace the EFSF on a perma-
nent basis, all make the granting of financial assistance subject to the respect of 
certain policy conditions by the beneficiary State. Lastly, conditionality is set play  
a pivotal role also in the context of the Outright Monetary Transactions 5 to be under-
taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) with the aim of, in the words of the 
ECB Governing Council, “ensuring an effective transmission of the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy and, thereby, […] securing the conditions for an effective conduct 
of the single monetary policy within the euro area, with a view to achieving its 
primary objective of maintaining price stability”.6 
 
In this context, conditionality is a preventative remedy that serves different pur-
poses. First, it aims to reduce moral hazard and to ensure that resources are actual-
ly used to solve the beneficiary State’s problems. Moreover, conditionality is also 
meant to protect the whole Eurozone against possible negative spill overs (the  
 
 1 Council Regulation (EC) No. 332/2002 of 18 February 2002, establishing a facility providing medium-term 
assistance for Member States’ balance of payments, OJ L 53 of 23.02.2002, p. 1 amended by Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1360/2008 of 2 December 2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No. 431/2009 of 18 May 2009. 
 2 Council Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010, establishing a European financial stabilization 
mechanism, OJ L 118 of 12.05.2010, p. 1. 
 3 The creation of the EFSF was envisaged in the Decision of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Euro Area Member States Meeting within the Council of the European Union, ECOFIN, Brussels, 
9 May 2010. Note of the General Secretariat of the Council No. 9614/10 [http://register.consilium. 
europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st09/st09614.en10.pdf]. 
 4 The Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) was signed in March 2012. 
The ESM was inaugurated on 8 October 2012. 
 5 Purchases by the ECB on secondary markets for sovereign bonds of bonds issued by Eurozone 
Member States. 
 6 ECB, Monthly Bulletin, October 2012, p. 7 [http://www.ecb.int/pub/mb/html/index.en.html]. 
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so-called ‘contagion effect’) by safeguarding its long-term financial stability. Lastly, 
tying financial support to the adoption of austerity measures is also meant to send 
a reassuring message to financial markets, by showing concerned States’ resolve in 
trying to address the root causes of the problem. 
 
The choice to make financial assistance conditional on the respect by the benefi-
ciary State of a macro-adjustment programme owes much to the influence exer-
cised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in shaping the EU response to 
the sovereign debt crisis.7 Indeed, despite being the “region with the best devel-
oped regional institutions, including a common currency and elaborate regional 
surveillance mechanism, [it] was not sufficiently equipped to deal with a major  
financial emergency among one of its member governments”8 and, albeit quite re-
luctantly at first, it had to rely upon IMF expertise. However, conditionality cannot 
be seen only as an external imposition, since the need to make financial assistance 
subject to the respect of strict policy requirements has been a firm request put 
forward by some EU Member States and by EU institutions alike. The emphasis 
put on conditionality in the context of financial assistance programmes has even 
led the EU to grant it full recognition at Treaty level. Indeed, in 2011 a new para-
graph was added to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European 
Union (TFEU), so to (allegedly) allow the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism, which mandates to make “the granting of any required financial assis-
tance under the mechanism […] subject to strict conditionality”.9 
 
So far, procedural rules for the definition, approval and monitoring of the condi-
tions attached to the financial assistance packages are not uniform, although they 
have several elements in common. In the case of Greece,10 the adjustment pro-
gramme has been negotiated by the Greek authorities with the European Com-
mission, acting in liaison with the ECB and the IMF (the so-called ‘Troika’), as 
previously established by Euro area Member States.11 These conditions have then 
been included in a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, in a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality and in a Technical Memorandum  
of Understanding.12 Subsequently, they have been further specified in a series of  
 
 7 F. Seitz and T. Jost, The Role of the IMF in the European Debt Crisis, HAW im Dialog – Weidener 
Diskussionpapiere No. 32, January 2012. 
 8 C.R. Henning, Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, WP 11-9, March 2011, p. 6. 
 9 B. De Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism, SIEPS 
European Policy Analysis No. 6, June 2011, pp. 5-8. The doubts raised as to the necessity of this 
amendment. 
 10 On the Greek case see K. Featherstone, “The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing 
State in a Skewed Regime”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 49, 2011, pp. 193-217; A. Viterbo and R. 
Cisotta, “La crisi della Grecia, l’attacco speculativo all’euro e le risposte dell’Unione Europea”, Il Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea, 2010, pp. 963-994. 
 11 Statement on the Support to Greece by Euro Area Member States, Brussels, 11 April 2010 
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/latest-press-releases/newsroomloadbook?target= 
2010&infotarget=&max=255&bid=76&lang=en]. 
 12 These memoranda have been first concluded on 3 May 2010. 
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decisions adopted by the Council in the context of the excessive deficit procedure 
within the Stability and Growth Pact.13 
 
A different procedure has been followed with regard to Ireland and Portugal  
in the context of the EFSM. Indeed, Article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 407/2010 
establishes that the State seeking financial assistance is to submit an adjustment 
programme to the Commission and to the Economic and Financial Committee. 
This programme is, then, to be approved by the Council, on a proposal by the 
Commission, with the adoption of a decision that contains the “general economic 
policy conditions which are attached to the Union financial assistance”. Lastly, 
these conditions are to be further detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) concluded by the recipient State and the Commission. Article 4 entrusts 
the Commission with the task of regularly verifying whether Members State’s poli-
cies accord with the adjustment programme and, accordingly, to decide the release 
of further instalments. 
 
The EFSF Framework Agreement establishes that the conditions attached to the 
financial assistance are to be included in a MoU negotiated by the beneficiary State 
with the Commission, acting together with the ECB and the IMF. Once the MoU 
has been approved by the Eurogroup Working Group, the Commission can sign 
the MoU on behalf of the Euro area States. A slightly different procedure has 
been codified in the ESM Treaty. Indeed, Article 13.3 establishes that the ESM 
Board of Governors, after having decided to grant stability support to a Member 
State, entrusts the Commission, in liaison with the ECB and “wherever possible” 
together with the IMF,14 to negotiate a MoU detailing the conditionality attached 
to the package. The MoU, once approved by the Board of Governors, is then to 
be signed by the Commission on behalf of the ESM. The Commission—together 
with the ECB and, “wherever possible”, the IMF—is also entrusted with the task 
of regularly monitoring compliance with the conditions detailed by the MoU, on 
which it depends the release of subsequent instalments. 
 
In November 2011, the Commission presented a Proposal for a Regulation 
(‘Budget Surveillance Proposal’) that, if adopted, would introduce a single condi-
tionality instrument that should apply whenever a Member State whose currency is 
the Euro requests or receives financial assistance from “one or several other 
States, the IMF, the EFSF or the ESM”.15 As for the procedure, Article 6 of the 
 
 13 See para. 3 for further references. 
 14 This choice may be considered as an attempt by European States and EU institutions—in primis  
the European Commission—to maintain, at least on paper, a leading role in the adoption of politically 
sensitive decisions, trying to exert a discretionary control over the IMF involvement. It is worth noting 
that a slightly different wording has been used in the ‘Term Sheet on the ESM’, attached to the European 
Council Conclusions of 20 April 2011, that says that ESM financial support is to be provided “on the 
basis of strict policy conditionality, under a macro-economic adjustment programme and a rigorous 
analysis of public debt sustainability” to be conducted by the Commission, in liaison with the European 
Central Bank, together with the IMF, without further caveats. 
 15 Article 6.1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties 
with respect to their financial stability in the euro area, COM(2011) 819 of 23.11.2011. 
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Proposal establishes that the beneficiary State is to prepare, in agreement with the 
Commission and the ECB, a draft adjustment programme that has, then, to be  
approved by the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal by the Com-
mission. The Commission and the ECB are also entrusted with the power to mon-
itor the implementation of the programme. The European Parliament, at its first 
reading,16 introduced some amendments in this regard. First, it clarified that the 
Commission and the ECB should act, “whenever appropriate”,17 in liason with the 
IMF to define or update the adjustment programme, while in its original version 
the Proposal did not recognize any role to the IMF neither in the negotiation, nor 
in the supervision phase. Secondly and, to some extents, more importantly, it also 
proposed to grant to the Commission the power to approve the programme, as 
the Council would only have the possibility to repeal this decision by qualified  
majority within ten days. 
 
 
 
3. THE CONTENT OF CONDITIONALITY: FINANCIAL STABILITY  
AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIORITY? 
 
Conditionality attached to the financial assistance packages devised to rescue Euro 
States is strongly reminiscent of the neo-liberal recipes imposed by the IMF in  
the context of its structural adjustment programmes of the ’80s and the ’90s.  
Indeed, these packages invariably rest upon draconian austerity measures, aiming 
at the reduction of States’ debt primarily through severe cuts to public spending 
and, in particular, through drastic reductions to social expenditure. In this context, 
several conditions touch upon key aspects of concerned States’ welfare systems, 
imposing the adoption of measures that have an impact even on the provision of 
basic services in the field of social protection, education and healthcare. 
 
In the case of Greece, for instance, the Council Decision 2011/734/EU18 estab-
lishes, inter alia, the abolition of the budgetary appropriations for the solidarity  
 
 16 Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of 
Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability 
in the Euro area, 13 June 2012, A7-0172/2012. 
 17 The ESM Treaty (Article 13.3) uses a similar wording, by stating that the IMF is to be involved 
“wherever possible”.  
 18 Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011, addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and 
deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to 
remedy the situation of excessive deficit, OJ L 296 of 15 November 2011, p. 38 amended by Council Decision 
2011/791/EU of 8 November 2011, OJ L 320 of 03.12.2011, p. 28 and Council Decision 2012/211/EU 
of 13 March 2012, OJ L 113 of 24.04.2012, p. 8. This act replaced Council Decision 2010/320/EU of  
8 June 2010, addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to 
Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit, OJ L 
145 of 11.06.2010, p. 6 amended by Council Decision 2010/486/EU of 7 September 2010, OJ L 241  
of 14.09.2010, p. 12, Council Decision 2011/57/EU of 20 December 2010, OJ L 26 of 29 January 2011, 
p. 15 and Council Decision 2011/257/EU of 7 March 2011, OJ L 110 of 07.03.2011, p. 26. 
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allowances19 (Article 2.1, lett. d), a freeze in the indexation of pensions (Article 2.2, 
lett. a), a reduction in pay rates for overtime work, enhanced flexibility in the man-
agement of working time and allow local territorial pacts to set wage growth below 
sectoral agreements (Article 2.2, lett. m), reduction in pharmaceutical expenditure 
by social security funds (Article 2.3, lett. n), tariff increases for the Athens trans-
portation network (Article 2.3, lett. x), measures to make firm-level agreements 
prevail over sector ones and to enhance the recourse to fixed-term contracts (Ar- 
ticle 2.3, lett. z), a comprehensive reform of the health care system (Article 2.4, 
lett. e) and a reform of the secondary or supplementary pension regimes (Article 
2.8, lett. a). Furthermore, Annex I of the above mentioned Decision envisages cuts 
in health care expenditure amounting to more than 2 billion euro by 2015 and cuts 
in social benefits amounting to more than 5 billion euro by the same year to be 
achieved through, inter alia, a reduction of the monetary transfers to certain cate-
gories of vulnerable persons. Similar measures can also be found in the decisions 
directed toward Ireland and Portugal. As for the former, the Council Implement-
ing Decision 2011/77/EU20 imposes reductions of social protection expenditure 
and of public service pensions (Article 3.6, Article 3.7, lett. b, and Article 3.8,  
lett. a), the reform of the minimum wage (Article 3.7, lett. h), as well as of the em-
ployment benefit system (Article 3.7, lett. i). Similarly, the Council Implementing 
Decision 2011/344/EU21 requires Portugal to reduce public sector wages and 
employment, to make cuts in pensions, as well as in education and health (Arti- 
cle 3.6, lett. b, and Article 3.7, lett. b). 
 
All these acts are geared toward restoring and safeguarding financial stability22 in 
the concerned State and in the Euro area as a whole, paying scant attention to any 
competing interest. The only partial exception can be found in the decisions con-
cerning Ireland and Portugal, as a modification introduced in 2011 provides that, 
in carrying out its monitoring duties, the Commission, together with the ECB and 
the IMF, is to “review the social impact of the agreed measures” and to recom-
mend necessary corrections in order to “minimiz[e] harmful social impacts, par- 
 
 19 With the exception of a part for poverty relief. 
 20 Council Implementing Decision 2011/77/EU of 7 December 2010, on granting Union financial 
assistance to Ireland, OJ L 30 of 04.02.2011, p. 34 amended by Council Implementing Decision 
2011/326/EU of 30 May 2011, in GU L 147 of 02.06.2011, p. 17; Council Implementing Decision 
2011/542/EU of 2 September 2011, OJ L 240 of 16.09.2011, p. 11; Council Implementing Decision 
2011/682/EU of 11 October 2011, OJ L 269 of 14.10.2011, p. 31; Council Implementing Decision 
2001/827/EU of 30 November 2011, OJ L 329 of 13.12.2011, p. 7 and Council Implementing Decision 
2012/375/EU of 22 June 2012, OJ L 182 of 13.07.2012, p. 37. 
 21 Council Implementing Decision 2011/344/EU of 30 May 2011, on granting Union financial assistance 
to Portugal, OJ L 159 of 17.06.2011, p. 88 amended by Council Implementing Decision 2011/541/EU of 
2 September 2011, OJ of 16.09.2011, p. 8; Council Implementing Decision 2011/683/EU of 11 October 
2011, OJ L 269 of 14.10.2011, p. 32; Council Implementing Decision 2012/92/EU of 14 December 
2011, OJ L 46 of 17.02.2012, p. 40; Council Implementing Decision 2012/224/EU of 29 March 2012,  
OJ L 115 of 27.04.2012, p. 21 and Council Implementing Decision 2012/409/EU of 10 July 2012, OJ L 
192 of 20.07.2012, p. 12. 
 22 Further on this concept from an international law perspective A. Viterbo, International Economic 
Law and Monetary Measures. Limitations to States’ Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement, Cheltenham and 
Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 4-56. 
F. Costamagna • Saving Europe ‘Under Strict Conditionality’: A Threat for EU Social Dimension? 11
ticularly on the most vulnerable parts of [the] society”.23 This notwithstanding, it 
can be safely argued that financial stability in this context still represents a priority, 
to be achieved even at the expenses of any other potentially conflicting objective. 
 
This one-sided approach was even more evident in the negotiation that led to  
the amendment of Article 136 TFEU, when the European Council rejected the 
proposal by the European Parliament to insert a reference to the need that  
the strict conditionality criteria attached to financial assistance had to be “in 
accordance with the principles and objective of the Union, as laid down in the 
Treaty of the European Union and this Treaty”.24 Similarly, the Commission’s 
Budget Surveillance Proposal25 that aims to establish a single conditionality 
procedure for all the financial assistance mechanism does not contain any 
reference to the need to ensure the compatibility of the policy conditions with 
other EU objectives and principles, such as, for instance, social ones. Once again, 
the European Parliament sought to fill this lacuna, by proposing, first of all, to add 
a reference to Article 9 already in the Preamble of the act.26 Furthermore, the 
Parliament proposed to amend the procedure for the definition of the macro 
adjustment programme, so to make it “respect the practices and institutions for 
wage formation and industrial relations in the Union”,27 “fully observe Article 151 
TFEU and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union”,28 “ensure sufficient means for fundamental policies such as education and 
health care”29 and be accompanied with an assessment, to be published, of its 
social consequences.30 In this case, there is a greater chance for these amendments 
to be eventually incorporated in the final version of the act. Indeed, the Parliament 
finds itself in a much stronger position31 than in the simplified revision procedure 
used to modify Article 136 TFEU,32 since the Regulation is to be adopted in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.33 
 
 
 
 
 23 This provision has been added, as it was not present in their original version, to both the Council 
Implementing Decision 2011/77/EU (Article 3.9) and Council Implementing Decision 2011/344/EU 
(Article 3.10) concerning respectively Ireland and Portugal. This kind of provision cannot be found in the 
decisions addressed to Greece. 
 24 Annex I to the European Parliament resolution on the draft European Council decision amending 
Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism 
for Member States whose currency is the Euro, 23 March 2011, C7-0014/2011. 
 25 See supra. 
 26 Amendment 2. 
 27 Amendment 41. 
 28 Ibidem.  
 29 Amendment 48. 
 30 Amendment 49. 
 31 For a wider-encompassing analysis on the role of the Parliament in this context see C. Fasone,  
The Struggle of the European Parliament to Participate in the New Economic Governance, EUI Working Papers, 
RSCAS 2012/45, August 2012. 
 32 Article 48.6 TEU grants to the Parliament only a consultative role. 
 33 As provided for by Article 121.6 TFEU. 
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4. CONDITIONALITY AND EU SOCIAL DIMENSION 
 
4.1. Strengthening EU Social Dimension: From Rome to Lisbon 
The strategy followed by EU institutions and Member States in trying to restore 
financial stability in the Euro area and, in particular, its over-reliance upon austeri-
ty measures, has attracted sustained criticism from many quarters. Indeed, these 
policies have been blamed for the hefty social price they are imposing upon  
concerned Member States and their population,34 without, in turn, delivering the 
expected results.35 
 
From a legal standpoint, this approach raises many doubts as to its compatibility 
with a number of EU basic social principles and objectives upon which rest the 
equilibrium between the economic and the social dimension within the EU legal 
order. In particular, its one-sided character appears hardly compatible with one of 
the defining feature of the ‘European economic constitution’,36 i.e. that economic 
growth and social cohesion must be seen as mutually reinforcing objectives that 
have to be pursued simultaneously by striking a balance between competing inter-
ests and values.37 
 
This vision, albeit often implemented in a less-than-consistent and coherent man-
ner, represents a prominent characteristic of the European integration process 
since its origins. The choice made by the Treaty of Rome of 1957 to exclude al-
most any possibility for the new subject to intervene in the social sphere, barring 
the conferral of those powers that were necessary to ensure the functioning of the 
internal market,38 was not due to founding fathers’ ‘social frigidity’ lamented by 
some commentators,39 but it was aimed to safeguard, or even strengthen, national 
 
 34 A. Heise and H. Lierse, Budget Consolidation and the European Social Model. The Effects of European 
Austerity Programmes on Social Security Systems, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2011; H. Frazer and  
E. Marlier, Social Impact of the Crisis and Developments in the Light of Fiscal Consolidation Measures, EU 
Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion, February 2011. 
 35 It is sufficient to observe that the debt-to-GDP ratio of Greece went from 145% in December 
2010 to 165% in September 2012 (source: Eurostat). As a consequence, on 8 November 2012, the Greek 
Parliament had to pass a new 13.5 billion euro austerity package. Even the IMF was quite critical on this 
point: see IMF, Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth, World Economic Outlook, October 2012. See 
also UNCTAD, Policies for Inclusive and Balanced Growth, Trade and Development Report, 2012, p. 13. 
 36 On this concept J. Drexl, “La Constitution économique européenne – L’actualité du modèle 
ordolibéral”, Revue internationale de droit économique, 2011, pp. 419-454; W. Devroe e P. Van Cleynenbreugel, 
“Observations on Economic Governance and the Search for a European Economic Constitution”,  
in D. Schiek, U. Liebert and H. Schneider (eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty  
of Lisbon, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 96-105; A. Hatje, “The Economic 
Constitution within the Internal Market”, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, Oxford and Portland, Hart Publisher, 2010, pp. 589-622. 
 37 This idea has been often expressed by making reference to the polysemic and uncertain concept of 
‘European social model’. On this concept see Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee 
on Social Cohesion: Fleshing Out the European Social Model, 6 July 2006, OJ C 309 of 16.12.2006,  
p. 119. 
 38 The main example being the conferral to the Council of the power to adopt legislative measures for 
the coordination of national social security systems, so to facilitate the free movement of workers. 
 39 G.F. Mancini, “Principi fondamentali di diritto del lavoro nell’ordinamento delle Comunità euro- 
pee”, in Il lavoro nel diritto comunitario e l’ordinamento italiano, Padova, CEDAM, 1988, p. 33. 
F. Costamagna • Saving Europe ‘Under Strict Conditionality’: A Threat for EU Social Dimension? 13
welfare states. Indeed, the decision of decoupling the social sphere, leaving the 
former firmly in Members States’ hands, from the economic one, which was 
opened to the intervention of the then EEC,40 rested on the assumption that the 
benefits accruing from an integrated market would have strengthened States’  
capacity to carry out its redistributive duties. The deterioration of the economic 
conditions in the ’70s exposed the flaws of this approach. On the other side, espe-
cially starting from the ’90s, the original division of labour came under challenge 
from the progressive ‘infiltration’41 of internal market law into the social sphere. 
Indeed, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) started to assess the 
compatibility of many key aspects of national welfare regimes with the functioning 
of a competitive internal market. This was the case, for instance, with the applica-
tion of competition rules to social insurance monopolies or free movement of ser-
vices norms to cross-border medical treatment.42 This evolution was strongly criti-
cized for posing serious risks to the functioning of national solidarity institutions,43 
as the common market was perceived as “the most pressing common challenge 
confronting national welfare states”.44 Indeed, despite the CJEU efforts to find  
a workable balance between economic and social interests, it was clear that the  
European integration process could be a destabilizing force in this regard,45 trying 
to open up systems that rest on a logic closure.46 Many commentators called, thus, 
for a reform of an asymmetrical institutional setting that was perceived as favour-
ing the creation of a competitive market over any other competing interest.47 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon sought to satisfy this demand, by introducing some elements 
of novelty that aim to strengthen the safeguard of social interests vis-à-vis economic 
ones within the EU legal order and, thus, to contribute to find a better balance  
between the economic and social dimension in this context. Most of these reforms 
 
 40 This kind of embedded liberalism was aptly described with the formula “Keynes at home, Smith 
abroad” by R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1987, p. 455. 
 41 G. Lyon-Caen, “L’infiltration du droit du travail par le droit de la concurrence”, Droit ouvrier, 1992, 
pp. 313-359. 
 42 On this evolution see F. Costamagna, I servizi socio-sanitari nel mercato interno europeo. L’applicazione delle 
norme dell’Unione Europea in materia di concorrenza, aiuti di Stato e libera circolazione dei servizi, Napoli, Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 2011. 
 43 See, ex multis, S. Giubboni, “Free Movement of Persons and European Solidarity”, European Law 
Journal, 13, 2007, pp. 360-379 and, with particular regard to health care, C. Newdick, “Citizenship, Free 
Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity”, Common 
Market Law Review, 43, 2006, pp. 1645-1668. 
 44 M. Ferrera and S. Sacchi, “A More Social EU: Issues of Where and How”, in S. Micossi and G.L. 
Tosato (eds), The European Union in the 21st Century: Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty, Brussels, CEPS, 2009, 
p. 36. 
 45 C. Joerges, “A Reinassance of the European Economic Constitution?”, in U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen 
and L.M. Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law, Copenhagen, Djøf Publishing, 2009, 
pp. 37-51. 
 46 As explained by Ferrera, redistributive regimes presuppose “the existence of a clearly demarcated 
and cohesive community, whose members feel that they belong to the same whole and that they are 
linked by reciprocity vis-à-vis common risks and similar needs”. See M. Ferrera, Friends, not Foes: European 
Integration and National Welfare States, URGE Working Paper No. 10/2006, p. 3. 
 47 F. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40, 2002, pp. 645-670. 
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have an eminently defensive character, seeking to shield national solidarity institu-
tions against the destabilizing effects that may derive from the application of EU 
law. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon left substantially untouched the allocation of 
competences in the social sphere, as it did not confer to the EU any new legal 
power to intervene in this field. Conversely, the Reform Treaty modified the cata-
logue of aims contained in Article 3 TEU, dropping the protection of undistorted 
competition from the list and giving an unprecedented visibility to wide array  
of social objectives. Furthermore, it also introduced a new provision—Article 9 
TFEU—that contains an ‘horizontal social clause’ imposing to the EU to take into 
account “requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment,  
the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and 
a high level of education, training and protection of human health” when defining 
or implementing its policies. Another innovation that is relevant in this regard is, 
as it will be better examined in one of the next paragraphs, the conferral of a legal-
ly binding value to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘Charter’) and, in particu-
lar, to the social rights contained therein. 
 
Consideration for Member States’ autonomy in organizing and financing their  
social systems, no absolute prioritization of economic objectives over social ones 
and respect for the Charter’s social rights are three fundamental components of 
EU social dimension that bind European institutions in the exercise of their func-
tions. Before assessing the compatibility of conditionality with these elements, 
there is the need to address a preliminary question concerning the applicability of 
these limits to the legal instruments detailing the conditions attached to the finan-
cial assistance packages. As seen above, these conditions are not formally imposed 
on the recipient State, but they are agreed by the latter with the Commission, act-
ing together with the ECB and the IMF.48 However, we contend that Treaties’ and 
Charter’ norms imposing the respect for social objectives, national competences 
and rights apply in the case at hand and, consequently, they are relevant to evalu-
ate the lawfulness and legitimacy of the way in which conditionality has been used 
in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
This conclusion rests upon two main arguments. First, these conditions, despite 
being detailed also in documents that are outside the EU legal system, are ulti-
mately approved by the Council and included in fully-fledged EU normative acts, 
adopted on the basis of EU primary or secondary law. This is very much evident 
with regard to Greece, whose adjustment programme has been embedded in a  
series of decisions adopted in the context of the excessive deficit procedure,  
pursuant to Articles 126.9 and 136.1 TFEU. But the same goes also with regard to  
the programmes for Ireland and Portugal that have been approved by the Council 
with decisions adopted on the basis of Council Regulation (EU) no. 407/2010. 
This will be even truer should the Budget Surveillance Proposal be adopted, as this 
act would introduce a single conditionality instrument fully within the EU legal 
 
 48 Supra para. 2. 
F. Costamagna • Saving Europe ‘Under Strict Conditionality’: A Threat for EU Social Dimension? 15
system. Secondly, European institutions cannot hide behind the allegedly consen-
sual nature of the conditions attached to the financial assistance packages to disre-
gard principles and objectives that represent foundational elements of the EU legal 
order and that, in any case, cannot be derogated by an ad hoc agreement between 
the Commission single Member States. 
 
The assumption that conditionality must be defined and applied in way that is 
consistent with, inter alia, Treaties’ norms on EU social dimension has been 
further validated, albeit only incidentally, in the Pringle case. Asked to rule on the 
compatibility with EU law of the decision to create a mechanism such as the ESM, 
the CJEU confirmed that Member States have the power to do so, provided that 
they intended to ensure, “by providing that the granting of any financial assistance 
under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality, that the 
mechanism will operate in a way that will comply with European Union law”.49 It 
can be, thus, inferred that, being it a guarantee for the mechanism to comply with 
EU law, conditionality cannot but fully respect all the limits set by the Treaties, 
also those concerning the social sphere. 
 
4.2. Conditionality and EU Competences in the Social Field: A Step Too Far? 
Conditionality attached to the financial assistance programmes for Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal touches upon many key aspects of national welfare regimes in a way 
that seems to go far beyond the limits imposed by the Treaties to the EU capacity 
to intervene in this field. 
 
As seen above, EU competences in the social field remain fairly limited even after 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 153.1 TFEU, for instance,  
establishes that, with regard to the combating of social exclusion and the moderni-
zation of social protection systems, the EU can only intervene to support and 
complement the activities of Member States that, hence, retain an exclusive com-
petence in these fields. The only partial exception concerns social security and so-
cial protection of workers, as in this field Article 153.2 TFEU gives to the Council, 
acting unanimously, the possibility to adopt directives imposing “minimum re-
quirements for gradual implementation”. However, Article 153.4 TFEU makes 
clear that these provisions cannot affect or impair Member States capacity to  
define the fundamental principles of their social security systems, nor affect  
the financial equilibrium thereof.50 Lastly, Article 153.5 TFEU rules out any EU 
intervention on issues such as pay and right of association. 
 
 
 49 Judgement of 27 November 2012, Pringle, Case C-370/12, nyr, para. 72.  
 50 Stevens observes that “[t]his means that each Member State is free to determine the details of its 
own social security system, including which benefits are to be provided, the conditions of eligibility, how 
these benefits are calculated and what level of contribution should be paid”. Y. Stevens, “Interactions 
Between Policy and Law Regarding Pensions”, in B. Cantillon, H. Verschueren and P. Ploscar (eds), Social 
Inclusion and Social Protection in the EU: Interactions Between Law and Policy, Cambridge, Antwerp-Portland, 
Intersentia, 2011, p. 159. 
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A similar situation can also be observed with regard to health care. According to 
Article 168 TFEU, EU action in this field can only complement national policies, 
excluding “any harmonization of the laws and regulations of Member States”. For 
good measure, Article 168.7 TFEU makes clear that, in any case, EU intervention 
has to respect “the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their 
health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical 
care”, especially with regard to the management of health care services and the  
decisions concerning the allocation of resources to finance their provision. 
 
The conditions contained in the Council decisions regulating the access of Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal to financial assistance mechanisms seem at odds with these 
limits.51 Therefore there is the need to determine whether the EU can, in the 
exercise of its powers to ensure financial stability in the Euro area, overcome these 
limits. This issue has been raised in two judicial actions brought in front of the 
General Court by representatives of a Greek trade union seeking the annulment of 
some of the decisions addressed to Greece.52 One of the grounds advanced by the 
applicants in support of their pleas is that Council’s measures violate the principle 
of conferral as established by Article 5 TEU. In particular, they contended that  
the measures adopted under the excessive deficit procedure “cannot be prescribed 
specifically, explicitly and without room for deviation, since that competence is 
not conferred upon the Council by the Treaties”. Similar arguments can also been 
raised with regard to the Council decisions directed toward Ireland and Portugal, 
as it is doubtful that Council Regulation (EU) no. 407/2010 allows for the 
prescription of measures with this level of detail. In this regard, it is worth 
observing that Article 3.3, lett. b, of the Regulation states that the decision 
granting a loan should contain only “the general economic policy conditions 
which are attached to the Union financial assistance”.53 Conversely, the decisions 
directed toward Ireland, Portugal, as well as those for Greece, have not a general 
character, nor they simply establish quantitative criteria that States have to meet  
in order to obtain the loans, but they impose the adoption of specific measures 
concerning pensions, social assistance funds, workers’ right of association, 
provision of medical services and financing of national health systems. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the provisions mandating the adoption of such measures are 
illegitimate, in so far as they unduly detract from States’ powers to organize their 
social protection systems. 
 
 51 D. Triantafyllou, “Les plans de sauvetage de la zone Euro et la peau de chagrin”, Revue du droit de 
l’Union Européenne, 2011, pp. 198-201. 
 52 ADEDY and Others v. Council, Case T-541/10, Action of 22 November 2010; ADEDY and Others  
v. Council, Case T-215/11, Action of 14 April 2011. However, the General Court will not rule on the  
merit of these actions as it declared them inadmissible for applicants’ lack of standing, as the latter  
failed to demonstrate that they were directly concerned by the challenged acts (ADEDY and Others,  
Case T-541/10, Order of 27 November 2012 and ADEDY and Others, Case T-215/11, Order of 27 
November 2012). 
 53 Emphasis added. 
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4.3. Conditionality and EU Treaties’ Social Objectives 
So far, one of the defining features of the strategy adopted to respond to the Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis is its exclusive focus on restoring financial stability, 
paying little, if any, attention to other competing objectives. As seen above, this 
one-sided approach appears hardly compatible with the overall vision that, at least 
on paper, lies at the core of the European integration process and, more poignant-
ly from a legal perspective, with the new catalogue of aims that the EU is bound to 
pursue with its action. Article 3 TEU, as modified by the Treaty of Lisbon, gives 
unprecedented visibility to a host of social objectives, putting them on a par with 
more traditional economic ones, such as the establishment of an internal market.54 
For instance, paragraph 3 of this article imposes to the EU to work for “the sus-
tainable development of Europe based on […] a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress […]”. Furthermore, the 
following indent establishes that the EU “shall combat social exclusion and  
discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between 
women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of 
the child”. 
 
This objectives sound admittedly hollow, as their proclamation has not been 
matched with the conferral to the EU of new social powers. For instance, criti-
cisms have been levelled against the reference to social market economy among 
the aims to be pursued by the EU. Joerges and Rödl contended that this reference 
stands in a vacuum, as the EU has not the capacity to intervene in fields—such as 
taxation and social policy—that are key for the implementation of the model.55 
This notwithstanding, the choice to grant constitutional status to social objectives 
is not meaningless, in so far as it imposes to European institutions to contribute  
to their achievement by, as a minimum, avoiding that the application of EU law 
could represent an obstacle to this end. Furthermore, this innovation calls EU  
decision-makers to find an adequate balance between objectives—economic and 
social ones—that now enjoy equal status within the EU legal order. 
 
This duty is reiterated and further specified by the so-called ‘horizontal social 
clause’ (Article 9 TFEU). This provision establishes that “in defining and imple-
menting its policies, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the 
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protec-
tion, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and 
protection of human health”. Although lacking bite in the definition of EU obliga-
tions, the clause has been defined as “the most important innovation of the  
Lisbon Treaty”, marking the “appearance within the constitutional arena of [a] po-
 
 54 F. Costamagna, “The Internal Market and the Welfare State: Anything New After Lisbon?”, in  
M. Trybus and L. Rubini (eds), The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy, Cheltenham 
and Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 385-389. 
 55 C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model?, EUI Working Paper  
No. 2004/8, May 2004, pp. 19-21. See also F. Scharpf, The Double Asymmetry of European Integration.  
Or: Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy, MPlfG Working Paper No. 09/12, November 2009. 
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tentially strong [anchor] that can induce and support all EU institutions […] in the 
task of finding an adequate (and more stable) balance between economic and  
social objectives”.56 Although originally drafted to stem the infiltration of internal 
market rules into the social field, this provision has a general scope of application, 
covering all EU policies. 
 
In the light of the above, doubts arise as to the legitimacy of conditionality, at least 
in the way it has been applied in the context of EU-sponsored financial assistance 
packages. On the one hand, the severity of austerity measures to be adopted by 
the States receiving financial assistance are hindering the pursuit of objectives set 
forth by Article 3 TEU, such as combating social exclusion or promoting social 
justice and protection. Indeed, harsh cuts to social expenditure are reducing 
national authorities’ capacity to meet even basic needs of their population, making 
social exclusion increase and social justice vanish. On the other hand, all these 
measures aim to restore financial stability paying little, if any, attention to any 
competing requirement and, thus, spending not too much efforts in trying to find 
a more appropriate balance between economic and social objectives as required  
by Article 9 TFEU. 
 
4.4. Conditionality and the Charter’s Social Rights 
Austerity measures adopted in response to the European sovereign debt crisis 
have a deep impact on the enjoyment of a wide array of basic social rights.57 
Therefore, their legitimacy is to be assessed also by looking at the obligations  
descending from the Charter and, in particular, from those provisions on funda-
mental social rights, such as the right to education (Article 14), access to social  
security and social assistance (Article 34), access to health care (Article 35) and  
access to services of general economic interest (Article 36). The Charter, which 
has been granted “the same legal value as the Treaties” (Article 6 TEU), is ad-
dressed to EU institutions and other bodies, as well as to Member States “when 
they are implementing Union law”. 
 
In order to assess the compatibility of conditionality with the Charter’s social 
rights, there is the need to clarify the normative scope of the relevant provisions, 
i.e. which obligations they actually impose upon EU and national institutions. In-
deed, these provisions are filled with caveats and limitations that Member States 
wanted to insert in order to avoid that the recognition of social rights in a legally 
 
 56 M. Ferrera, “Modest Beginnings, Timid Progresses: What’s Next for Social Europe?”, in B. 
Cantillon, H. Verschueren and P. Ploscar (eds), op. cit., p. 29. 
 57 CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Austerity measures – A danger for democracy and social rights, Resolution 
no. 1884 of 26 June 2012. Cephas Lumina, UN independent expert on foreign debt and human rights, 
observed that, with regard to Greece, “the implementation of the second package of austerity measures 
and structural reforms […] have a serious impact on basic social services and therefore the enjoyment of 
human rights by Greek people, particularly the most vulnerable sectors of the population, such as the 
poor, elderly, unemployed and persons with disabilities”. See “Greek Austerity Measures Could Violate 
Human Rights, UN Expert Says”, UN News Centre, 30 June 2011 [http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 
story.asp?NewsID=38901&Cr=austerity&Cr1#.UKEnBrSFhz8]. 
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binding instrument could end up imposing further limits on their social sovereign-
ty. This led some commentators to argue that the Charter’s social rights are not 
fully-fledged rights, but only programmatic principles.58 Pursuant to Article 52.5 of 
the Charter, social rights’ provisions could not be given direct effect, as they do 
not give rise to directly enforceable rights. However, the attempt to force all social 
rights into the ‘principles’ category looks over simplistic and, in the end, fallacious. 
As demonstrated by many commentators,59 and further confirmed by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,60 social rights can give rise 
to different types of obligations, some of them being directly enforceable, while 
other having a more programmatic character. This means that, as observed by 
some authors with regard to the Charter, “good arguments can be made for rang-
ing fundamental social rights in the ‘rights’ category, rather than in the ‘principles’ 
one”.61 In any case, this distinction only concerns the possibility for these provi-
sions to “give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or 
Member States’ authorities”62 and, thus, it does not affect their functions as yard-
sticks for social legitimacy. 
 
A first provision that is relevant in this context is Article 34 of the Charter, whose 
paragraph 1 imposes to the Union to recognise and respect “the entitlements to 
social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as 
maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of 
loss of employment”. Paragraph 3 of the same article adds that “[i]n order to 
combat social exclusion and poverty” the duty to ‘recognize and respect’ also ap-
plies to the right of social and housing assistance, “so as to ensure a decent exist-
ence for all those who lack sufficient resources”. According to some commenta-
tors,63 this provision is to be read as safeguarding a minimum core of this right, 
prohibiting EU institutions, as well as national ones when implementing EU law, 
from adopting retrogressive measures that could put in jeopardy the access to 
those services that are necessary to meet the right-holder’s basic needs or, to use 
the wording of Article 34.3 of the Charter, to run a decent existence.64 
 
 58 Lord Goldsmith Q.C., “A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles”, Common Market Law Review, 
38, 2001, p. 1213. 
 59 R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, “Responsabilité de l’État pour violation des obligations positives relatives aux 
droits de l’homme”, Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International de l’Haye, 333, 2009, pp. 429-489. 
 60 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 3. The Nature of State 
Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1), 5th Session (1990), E/1991/23. 
 61 D. Damjanovic and B. De Witte, “Welfare Integration through EU Law: The Overall Picture in the 
Light of the Lisbon Treaty”, in U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen and L.M. Roseberry (eds), op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
 62 Explanation of Article 52 – Scope and interpretation of rights and principles. 
 63 O. De Schutter, “La garantie des droits et principes sociaux dans la Charte des droits 
fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne”, in J-L. Charlier and O. De Schutter (eds), La Charte des droits 
fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne. Son apport à la protection des droits de l’Homme en Europe. Hommage à Silvius 
Marcus Helmons, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2002, pp. 120-121; A. Giorgis, “Art. 34. Sicurezza sociale e assistenza 
sociale”, in R. Bifulco, M. Cartabia and A. Celotto (eds), L’Europa dei diritti. Commento alla Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001, pp. 242-243. 
 64 This interpretation is strongly reminiscent of the ‘minimum core doctrine’ that had been elaborated 
by the UN ESCR Committee in response to claim according to which economic, social and cultural rights 
had only a programmatic nature (see ESCR Committee, General Comment no. 3, cit., para. 3). On this 
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This interpretation can be largely agreed with, as it is consistent with the ultimate 
purpose of the provision. Furthermore, this reading is in line with Articles 12, 30 
and 31 of the European Social Charter (revised), upon which paragraphs 1 and 3 
of Article 34 of the Charter are based.65 In particular, Article 30 of the European 
Social Charter requires States parties “to take measures […] to promote the effec-
tive access of persons who live or risk living in a situation of social exclusion or 
poverty […] to, in particular, employment, housing, training, education, culture 
and social and medical assistance”. It is worth noting that this purposive interpre-
tation of Article 34 has been recently endorsed also by the CJEU in a case con-
cerning the access to a housing benefit by an Albanian national who had the status 
of long-term resident.66 In particular, the CJEU relied upon Article 34 of the Char-
ter as a tool to interpret the notion of “core benefits” contained in Article 11.4  
of Directive 2003/109/EC.67 The CJEU observed that Article 34 of the Charter, 
aiming to guarantee the possibility to enjoy a decent existence to all those who 
lack sufficient resources, imposes to interpret the above-mentioned provision in 
the sense of ensuring to all long-term residents access on a non-discriminatory  
basis to all those benefits that enable them to meet “their basic needs such as 
food, accommodation and health”.68 
 
The same interpretative approach could be adopted also with regard to other  
social rights of the Charter. This can be the case with Article 35 of the Charter, 
recognizing the right to have access “to preventative health care and […] to bene-
fit from medical treatment […]”. Accordingly, EU institutions and, as far as the 
implementation of EU law is concerned, national authorities are called upon to 
fully respect this right, avoiding, as a minimum, the adoption of measures that can 
make access to basic health care services too burdensome, especially for the most 
vulnerable parts of the population. Indeed, this provision is based on Article 13 of 
the European Social Charter that, in strong continuity with the other provisions 
seen above, requires States parties to make sure that “any person who is without 
adequate resource […] be granted adequate assistance and, in the case of sickness, 
the care necessitated by his condition”. Furthermore, similar obligations can also 
be read into Article 14 of the Charter, that, after having recognized “the right to 
education and to have access to vocational and continuing training”, set out what 
can be considered as the minimum core of this right. Indeed, its second paragraph 
establishes that “[t]his right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory ed-
ucation”. Therefore, European and national institutions have to ensure that access 
 
doctrine see, ex multis, K.G. Young, “The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in 
Search of Content”, The Yale Journal of International Law, 33, 2008, pp. 113-175. 
 65 Explanation of Article 34 – Social security and social assistance. 
 66 Judgement of 24 April 2012, Kamberaj, case C-571/10, nyr. On this judgement see F. Costamagna, 
“Diritti fondamentali e prestazioni sociali essenziali tra diritto dell’Unione Europea e ordinamenti interni: 
il caso Kamberaj”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 6, 2012, pp. 672-679. 
 67 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 Novembre 2003, concerning the status of third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents, OJ L 16 of 23.01.2004, p. 66. 
 68 Kamberaj, para. 91. 
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to compulsory education is free of charge, avoiding the adoption of measures that 
go against this result. 
 
Early assessments of the social impact of austerity measures raises several doubts 
as to the compatibility of the conditions attached to financial assistance packages 
with some of the Charter’s social rights, even if taken in such a minimalist version. 
Cuts to social expenditure are so severe and wide-ranging to make increasingly dif-
ficult for national authorities to ensure even the provision of basic social services. 
Furthermore, austerity measures are disproportionately affecting lower income 
classes and some of the most vulnerable categories of the population—such as  
elderly, children, jobless and disabled persons—, as they are more dependant on 
social welfare or less able to have access to more costly services. One of the most 
visible example in this regard is that of the Greek health system, as its benefit 
packages has been reduced and many public hospitals are unable to buy medicines 
and medical equipment necessary to provide reimbursable treatments.69 Further-
more, Greece was forced to increase user charges, with only limited exceptions for 
certain vulnerable groups.70 A similar situation can be observed also with regard  
to other sectors, such as that of housing assistance. The reduction of available  
resources has forced national authorities to cut back public housing programs  
for those that cannot afford paying market prices, causing a dramatic increase of 
homeless persons and households.71 
 
The available data, despite their partial coverage, seem to show the existence of  
a prima facie incompatibility between some of the conditions attached to financial 
rescue packages and the Charter’s social rights. This notwithstanding, the fact that 
there seems to be greater attention toward adjustment programs’ social implica-
tions. As duly emphasised by the Commission with regard to the Greek case,72 
concrete steps, such as imposing larger reductions in higher pensions, have been 
taken to minimise the impact of austerity measures on the most vulnerable strata 
of the population. In any case, simply showing that the implementation of condi-
tionality determines a reduction in living standards is not enough to prove that 
these measures are illegitimate. Indeed, retrogressive measures are not forbidden 
per se, but only if they cannot be justified in the light of the context in which these 
measures have been adopted, their objectives and the way in which they have been 
designed and implemented.73 Social protection standards cannot be considered as 
 
 69 D. Kaitelidou and E. Kouli, “Greece: The Health System in a Time of Crisis”, Eurohealth, 18, 2012, 
pp. 12-14. 
 70 Ireland was also forced to adopt this measure. See S. Thomas and S. Burke, “Coping with Austerity 
in the Irish Health System”, Eurohealth, 18, 2012, p. 8. 
 71 For instance, NGOs’ estimates show that the number of homeless persons in Greece went from 
11,000 in 2009 to 20,000 in 2012. See G.A. Stamatis, “Homeless in Greece in the Current Financial Crisis. 
What Perspectives?”, May 2012 [http://www.feantsa.org/code/en/pg.asp?Page=24&pk_id_news=5900]. 
 72 European Commission, The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Occasional Paper  
No. 94, March 2012, pp. 6-7. 
 73 The ESCR Committee made clear that “any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard 
would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the 
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having an absolute character, as competent national authorities retain their power 
to continuously revise them, especially when this required to quell the threat posed 
by a financial crisis as grave as the present one.74 
 
Furthermore, as provided for by Article 52.1 of the Charter, there is the possibility 
to limit the exercise of the rights to pursue “objectives of general interest recog-
nized by the Union […]”. There are few doubts that the derogation clause could 
find application in this case, as the re-establishment of financial stability in the 
concerned States and in the whole Euro area, by avoiding contagion to other fel-
low countries, can be regarded as a legitimate objective of general interest of the 
EU.75 Indeed, ensuring sound public finance and monetary conditions is a prin- 
ciple that must guide the actions of EU and national institutions in the context  
of the economic and monetary policy, as provided for by Article 119 TFEU. Fur-
thermore, it is evident that safeguarding financial stability is an essential condition 
to ensure a future not just to the EMU, but to the European integration process  
as a whole. In this context, the reduction of social expenditure could represent a 
reasonable tool to achieve this objective, due to the importance of this item for 
States’ budget.76 
 
However, there are other requirements that have to be met if limitations to the  
exercise of the rights recognized by the Charter are to be legitimately imposed. 
First of all, any limitation must respect “the essence” of the rights. This notion has 
much in common with that of ‘minimum core’, as both of them refer to those 
conditions that are necessary for a dignified existence. In the light of what seen 
above, it is dubious that conditionality, at least in the way it has been designed and 
implemented in the context of the rescue packages for Greece, Ireland and Portu-
gal, could be said to safeguard the essence of social rights. 
 
Similar problems may also arise with other requirements set forth by the 
derogation clause, i.e. that limitations must be subject to the principle of 
proportionality and that they have to be “necessary and genuinely meet” the 
objectives pursued. It is not possible to fully explore all the implications of  
a requirement that, if taken seriously, could severely restrict the number of 
 
totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum 
available resources” (see ESCR Committee, General Comment no. 3, cit., para. 9). 
 74 It is worth observing that this stance has been consistently taken also by the European Committee 
of Social Rights in interpreting many of those articles that represent for Charter’s provisions that are 
relevant in this context. For instance, in a case concerning the application of the right to social security 
(Article 12 of the European Social Charter) to a change of the social security scheme to members of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office emphasised that “States enjoy a wide margin of discretion on how to organize 
their social security systems, including defining the personal scope of schemes providing health care 
benefits, as long as a significant percentage of population is covered and the benefits provided are 
sufficiently extensive” (European Committee of Social Rights, Decision on the Merit: Sindicado do Magistratos 
do Ministerio Publico (SMMP) v. Portugal, Collective Complaint No. 43/2007, Decision of 3 December 
2008). 
 75 Despite not being included in the list of Article 3 TFEU. 
 76 According to Eurostat data, in 2008 social expenditure—including health one, but excluding that 
for pensions—amounted to 26.4% of EU GDP. 
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admissible limitations. However, it is worth observing that exclusive reliance upon 
austerity, at the expenses of any other competing interest, can be hardly considered 
as a proportionate and necessary response to the crisis. Indeed, the experience of 
other non-EU States77 that were severely hit by the crisis demonstrates that 
alternative strategies, more attentive to the safeguard of social rights, could have 
been adopted. Lastly, questions arise also with regard to the capacity of austerity 
measures to “genuinely meet” the objective of restoring financial stability, as data 
show that their negative impact on economic growth is contributing to further 
reduce States’ revenues and, in the end, worsening their financial situation. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper sought to assess the compatibility of policy conditionality attached to 
EU-sponsored financial assistance packages with the three main pillars of EU  
social dimension. The analysis showed that several features of these measures are 
at odds with fundamental social objectives and principles set out by the Treaty, as 
well as with some of the social rights recognized by the Charter. 
 
More in detail, the conditions enshrined in the Council decisions directed toward 
recipient States touch upon key aspects concerning the functioning of national so-
cial regimes, unduly encroaching upon States’ competences in this field. Moreover, 
these measures are exclusively geared toward restoring financial stability in the  
Euro area, paying little, if any, attention to competing social objectives. This fea-
ture is incompatible with the choice made by the Lisbon Treaty to put social  
objectives on a par with economic ones. This, as further specified by Article 9 
TFEU, imposes to the EU to find a suitable balance between potentially conflict-
ing objectives, as they enjoy equal status within the EU legal order. Lastly, the  
severe cuts to social expenditure imposed as a condition to obtain financial help 
are making increasingly difficult for national authorities to ensure even the provi-
sion of basic services. Austerity measures are disproportionately affecting the most 
vulnerable categories of the population, which are more dependant on social  
welfare to satisfy their basic needs. All these elements point to the existence of a  
prima facie incompatibility between conditionality and some of the Charter’s social 
rights. Indeed, these measures are affecting the minimum core, or the “essence”, 
to use the wording of Article 52.1 of the Charter, of these rights, and doubts can 
be raised as to whether they are justified as a proportionate, necessary and suitable 
response to the crisis. 
 
 77 As it is the case of Iceland, where the Government decided to adopt relatively small cuts to public 
spending and to prioritize the welfare state and employment legislation. On this see R. Wade and S. 
Sigurgeirsdottir, “Iceland’s Rise, Fall, Stabilization and Beyond”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 36, 2012, 
pp. 127-144. For a legal analysis of the Icelandic case see A. Viterbo, “The Return of Capital Controls as 
Emergency Tools to Counter Financial Crises. Iceland’s Crisis and the Constraints Imposed by the EEA 
Agreement”, Capital Markets Law Journal, 6, 2011, pp. 214-237. 
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If taken together, all these aspects can be considered as signs of a more profound 
and far reaching incompatibility between the one-sided strategy devised to safe-
guard financial stability in the Euro area, with its over-reliance upon austerity 
measures, and one of the defining feature of the European economic constitution, 
according to which economic integration and social cohesion must be seen as  
mutually reinforcing objectives to be pursued by finding a balance between com-
peting interests and values. The problem is not with conditionality per se, but  
with the way in which it has been defined and applied by EU institutions. Indeed, 
making the release of rescue funds conditional on an adjustment programme  
represents a necessary step in order to ensure that the beneficiary State addresses 
the root causes of its plight. However, there is the need for a substantive reas-
sessment of the content of the conditions attached to the assistance packages, by 
fully recognizing the impact of an instrument that represents “[t]he only institu-
tional process potent enough to pursue structural reforms”78 as it is used toward 
countries that have little option but to accept it. 
 
This is a task for EU decision-makers that must start to consider respect for social 
rights and objectives not as an obstacle to achieve financial stability, but rather as  
a building block of a more efficient exit strategy from the crisis. The European 
Parliament can certainly play an important role to this end, as demonstrated by  
the amendments formulated with regard to the Proposal for a regulation that aims 
to establish a single conditionality instruments applicable to all the mechanism for 
financial assistance. There are signs that also Member States and the Commission 
are realizing the need for a different approach, more attentive to the safeguard of 
social objectives and rights. Indeed, blind adherence to old-fashioned neo-liberal 
recipes may cause long-lasting damages to EU social cohesion and to the legitima-
cy of the whole integration process. 
 
 78 D. Adamski, “National Power Games and Structural Failures in the European Macroeconomic 
Governance”, Common Market Law Review, 49, 2012, p. 1363. 
